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LECTRONIC  MAIL  (EMAIL)  ENJOYS  WIDE 
acceptance among the general public1,2 but has 
more limited acceptance among physicians.3 A 
2005  survey  found  that  46%  of  Canadian  physicians 
used email to communicate with colleagues for clinical 
purposes.4  Although  email  can  be  extremely  useful, 
physicians need to appreciate the potential hazards of 
using  email  in  clinical  practice.5  The  College  of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) has noted 
that  “e-mailing  or  faxing  unencrypted  patient  health 
information is really no more secure than sending that 
information on a postcard,”6 and that “those physicians 
who wish to send personal health information by email 
should use an encrypted or otherwise secure system.”7 
The  American  Medical  Informatics  Association  has 
offered similar guidance.8 
  This article outlines how email works, introduces the 
basics of encryption, and highlights the important role 
that encryption has to play in the clinical use of email. It 
does  not  recommend  specific  pieces  of  commercial 
software,  since  both  software  and  encryption 
technology are constantly evolving. 
Clinical vignette 
A  specialist  visits  a  clinic  in  a  remote  city  to  provide 
consultations.  While  there,  the  physician  dictates 
consultation  notes  that  are  transcribed  by  the  clinic 
staff. The transcribed notes are sent at a later time by 
email to the consultant for review and editing; they are 
then  returned  to  the  remote  clinic  by  email  for 
distribution and inclusion in the patient record. 
Question 1: Does the use of email in this  
scenario result in risks to confidentiality? 
Yes,  there  are  definite  potential  risks.  To  understand 
why, it is essential to first understand how email works. 
How email works 
Email  is  not  sent;  it  is  copied.  In  contrast  to  a 
regular  letter  sent  via  the  postal  service,  an  email 
message is not carried from one computer to another; 
rather,  the  original  message  is  copied  to  the  remote 
location, while the original copy remains at the sending 
location, in a  manner similar  to  what happens  in  the 
transmission of a facsimile (fax). 
 
Copies  of  email  are  generated  on  multiple 
computers.  Email  is  relayed  via  a  network  of  client 
and server computers, such that one copy is generated 
at each computer participating along the way (Fig. 1).9 
This process is documented in the header of each email 
message and can be inspected if the header is viewed 
(Fig. 2).10,11 In principle, a copy of the original message 
could be accessed by anyone with computer expertise, 
physical  or  network  access  to  any  one  of  these 
computers,  and  the  necessary  passwords.  Typically, 
servers  retain  copies  of  emails  that  they  relay  only 
temporarily,  in  order  to  conserve  storage  space; 
however,  these  copies  are  not  necessarily  deleted 
immediately. Moreover, servers are typically backed up 
from time to time, so there is no guarantee that copies 
of email in temporary storage on a server will not be 
preserved indefinitely as part of a backup. 
 
Can you be sure that the sender’s and receiver’s 
computers  are  secure?  Many  personal  computers 
(PCs) are used by more than one person — for example, 
by  family  members  at  home  or  colleagues  at  work. 
Moreover,  some  operating  systems  —  notably,  most 
versions of Windows — are not configured by default to 
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Figure 1: Email transmission. Email is relayed via a network of client and server computers. An email client — typically a 
personal computer (PC) running an email program such as Microsoft Outlook, Mozilla Thunderbird, Netscape Mail, or Qualcomm 
Eudora — does two things: it lets you compose an email message, then it transmits the message to an email server. A server, 
typically a corporate computer connected to the Internet (shown in grey), inspects the destination address of each incoming 
email and checks if it knows where to find the computer belonging to the addressee. If it does, it copies the message to the 
destination computer; if it does not, it copies the email message to another mail server that should have information about how 
to connect with the addressee’s computer.
9 If email is transmitted via an intranet — a network of clients (“A” and “B”) and 
servers (shown in green) exclusively owned and operated by a single organization, such as with some hospitals — copies of the 
email  (also  shown  in  green)  will  not  be  generated  outside  this intranet.  This  will  be  more  secure  to  the  extent  that  only 
employees of the organization have access to the computers that make up this network. In contrast, email transmitted in whole 
or in part via the Internet (e.g., from client “A” to client “C”) will generate a trail of copies (shown in orange) on one or more 
servers. In general, it is difficult to ascertain the security of the Internet servers (shown in grey) that are part of this trail. 
 
restrict one user’s ability to access other users’ files.12 
Thus, it is possible that persons other than the sender 
or the intended recipient may be able to access email 
messages  not  intended  for  them  on  the  sender’s  or 
recipient’s  computer.  Also,  it  is  possible  for 
unauthorized  users  to  impersonate  physicians  if  the 
computer is not properly configured. 
Summary. In this vignette, email is sent from clinic to 
consultant via mail servers on the Internet; the owners 
and  operators  of  the  servers  are  unknown.  There  are 
three  loci  at  which  someone  could  intercept  and 
potentially read the clinic notes: the sender’s computer; 
any of the mail servers that relayed the email; and the 
recipient’s  computer.  Even  if  one  demands  that  the 
sender  and  the  recipient  be  responsible  for  securing 
access  to  their  computers,  copies  of  the  email  are 
generated at each of the servers; confidentiality could 
be breached at any one of them. 
Question 2: What reasonable steps could be taken 
to decrease the risk to patient confidentiality? 
In practice, there are two straightforward solutions. 
1. Strip the consultation  note  of  all identifying 
patient  information.  However,  this  is  typically 
inconvenient and time-consuming. ANALYSIS AND COMMENT                                                                                                                                    KREINDLER 
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Return-Path: <jackie@mps.on.ca> 
Received: via tmail-2002(14) for kreindler; Thu, 19 Feb 2004 08:16:56 -0500 (EST) 
Received: from bureau15.ns.utoronto.ca by bureau20.ns.utoronto.ca; Thu, 19 Feb 2004 08:16:42 
-0500 
Received: from bureau23.ns.utoronto.ca by bureau15.ns.utoronto.ca; Thu, 19 Feb 2004 08:16:30 
-0500 
Received: from fep3.cogeco.net by bureau23.ns.utoronto.ca for <david.kreindler@utoronto.ca>; 
Thu, 19 Feb 2004 08:16:30 -0500 
Received: from kj604012 (d146-8-124.home1.cgocable.net [24.146.8.124]) by fep3.cogeco.net 
(Postfix) with SMTP id DE2A347D4 for <david.kreindler@utoronto.ca>; Thu, 19 Feb 2004 
08:12:49 -0500 (EST) 
From:  "Jackie S" <jackie@mps.on.ca> 
To:  "David Kreindler" <david.kreindler@utoronto.ca> 
Subject: dictation 
Date:  Thu, 19 Feb 2004 08:16:07 -0500 
Organization: M-PS Community Health Service 
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158 
 
David, hope you had an uneventful trip home, attached is the dictation. See you next month. 
Jackie 
 
------=_NextPart_000_0005_01C3F6C0.A016AC20 
Content-Type: application/msword;   name="pat.doc" 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pat.doc" 
0M8R4KGxGuEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPgADAP7/CQAGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABAAAAA
A 
EAAAPAAAAAEAAAD+////AAAAADkAAAD/////////////////////////////////// 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////s 
pcEATSAJBAAA8BO/ADQAAAAAEAAAAAAABAAAtC8AAA4AYmpiauI94j0AAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAJBBYAJToAAJyncz/6oFSxNRQhAckSZ70+Am6nucuNi4eYFxuHLZ3ioO/cHa5dS3 
(etc.) 
 
Figure 2: An email message. A sample email message, including the header (A), body (B), and the initial portion of 
an attachment (C). Mail clients are typically set by default to display only selected portions of the message header, 
such as the “From,” “To,” “Subject,” and “Date” lines. Among the lines typically hidden are the “Received” lines, 
which in this case document the four servers that relayed this message from the sender to the recipient. Each of these 
servers may retain copies of the entire message, including the attachment. Unless securely encrypted, the attached 
file — in this case, “pat.doc,” a Microsoft Word file — can easily be recreated from any one of these copies. In this 
message, the attachment has been encoded using Base64,
10 a very simple and insecure kind of encryption. (Base64 
converts any kind of computer file into a block of text comprised of the limited set of characters — specifically, letters, 
numbers, and punctuation — that email software was designed to handle when email was first developed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.)
11 
2. Encrypt  the  email.  If  an  email  is  the  Internet 
equivalent of a postcard, the encryption process acts 
as an envelope. 
How encryption works 
Cryptography,  encryption  and  decryption. 
Cryptography  refers  to  processes  for  converting  text 
from a readable to an unreadable format (“encryption”) 
and  back  again  (“decryption”).  Modern  cryptographic 
systems generate a set of random digits that are then 
protected using a password or passphrase selected by 
the user, creating the key. The key is used to scramble 
(i.e., encrypt) the text. If viewed  while encrypted,  the 
text appears to be a string of random incomprehensible 
characters. Only when provided with the proper key can 
the original text be unscrambled (i.e., decrypted) into 
the original text. 
  Modern  cryptographic  systems  can  be  divided  into 
two  broad  classes,13  based  on  how  keys  are  handled: 
secret key (or symmetric key) systems, and public key 
systems. These are summarized in Table 1.13–29 
 
How  secure  is  an  encrypted  document?  An 
encrypted  document’s  security  —  its  ability  to  resist 
being read by unauthorized third parties — depends on 
(i) the strength of the encryption system that is being 
used,  and  (ii)  the  strength  and  confidentiality  of  the 
key. If a password protecting either the sender’s or the ANALYSIS AND COMMENT                                                                                                                                    KREINDLER 
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Table 1: Cryptosystem characteristics 
Class  Secret key cryptosystems  Public key cryptosystems‡ 
Prerequisites  Sender and recipient must communicate with 
each other to agree on (i) encryption software 
and (ii) a key or password that will be used to 
encrypt and decrypt the message.  
Sender and recipient must each (i) create a 
public / private key pair and (ii) publish the  
public key. (The private key is kept strictly  
confidential. 
(iii) Sender and recipient may need to  
communicate with each other to agree on 
encryption software if using incompatible 
software. 
Encryption / decryption  Text is both encrypted and decrypted with the 
agreed-upon key or password. 
Text is encrypted by the sender using the 
recipient’s public key and decrypted by the 
recipient using the recipient’s private key. 
Password reuse  Avoid re-using passwords with different  
correspondents. If you mistakenly send an  
encrypted document to the wrong recipient,  
it will be protected against decryption only if  
that recipient does not know or cannot guess  
the password. 
Your public/private key pair can be re-used  
with any number of correspondents. 
Advantages  Less computer-intensive (i.e., requires fewer 
calculations) but has comparable security to 
public key systems. 
Requires no prior communication between  
recipients (if using compatible cryptosystems and 
digital certificates from a Certificate Authority). 
Disadvantages  Requires prior communication to choose 
encryption software and a password.  
Moreover, if you are concerned about the 
security of email, using email to discuss which 
password will be used is senseless! 
Requires each correspondent to have published 
his or her public key (see “Getting started with 
encrypted mail”) 
Not all email client software (e.g., some webmail 
clients) is compatible. 
Examples  Most commercial word-processing, 
spreadsheet, or compression software that 
allows documents to be saved with a password. 
S/MIME; PGP. 
Web browsers’ mechanisms for establishing 
secure connections to websites. 
Revocation of keys  If compromised, every person using the same 
password must be contacted to change the 
password.  
PGP and certificate-based systems have ways of 
revoking a public key without a communication to 
each person using it.  
‡ In practice, most “public key” cryptosystems are in fact hybrid public/secret key systems. Public key systems result in encrypted  
messages that are both substantially longer and require more computer time to create than a comparably strong secret key system.
17 
Therefore, most popular implementations of public key systems (such as S/MIME
13,28 or PGP
17,29) (1) generate a random, one-time use 
session key, (2) use a public key system to securely transmit this session key between the sender and the recipient, and then (3) transmit 
the body of the message encrypted using this session key and a specified secret key cryptosystem.  
 
recipient’s key is intercepted by a third party (e.g., by 
being overheard, stolen, inadvertently disclosed, etc.) or 
the key is discovered, the document is no longer secure. 
Broadly  speaking,  there  are  three  ways  by  which  an 
unauthorized third party can decrypt and read (“crack”) 
an encrypted message when the sender’s or recipient’s 
computer is secure: 
1. Guessing the password. A thorough discussion of 
password  selection  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
article.14–17  Briefly,  if  a  cryptosystem’s  key  is 
protected  by  a  user-supplied  password,  the  key  is 
vulnerable to anyone with access to the system. The 
degree  of  vulnerability  depends  on  the  strength  of 
the  user-supplied  password.  Words  found  in  a 
dictionary are poor (“weak”) choices, since they are 
relatively  easy  to  guess,  as  are  birth  dates,  phone 
numbers,  maiden  names,  etc.,  or  any  minor 
variations of these. Unusual combinations of letters, 
numbers, and punctuation are better choices, as are 
long  multi-word  combinations  with  interspersed 
numbers  or  punctuation.  Long  random  character 
sequences are “strongest,” i.e., hardest to guess, but 
these can be difficult to remember.*  
                                                 
*One way to remember multiple passwords is to use password 
management software. Password management software lets 
you record all your passwords in a single database, which is 
then  encrypted  with  a  single  master  password  using  high-ANALYSIS AND COMMENT                                                                                                                                    KREINDLER 
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2. Guessing  the  key.  It  is  theoretically  possible  to 
decrypt  an  encrypted  message  by  guessing  the  key 
that  was  used  to  encrypt  it.  The  advantage  of  this 
method is that it does not depend on access to the 
sender’s or receiver’s computer. The disadvantage is 
that the attack — referred to as a brute force attack 
— is extremely resource- and time-consuming. One 
example of successful brute force attacks is against 
the  widely  available  but  poorly  implemented  RC-4 
encryption system13,17 included with Microsoft Word 
2000.18  In  principal,  RC-4  is  a  good  encryption 
system19;  however,  to  comply  with  United  States 
export  laws,17,20,21  the  implementation  of  RC-4  in 
Word  2000  is  limited  to  240  or  1 099 511 627 776 
possible  passwords  (technically,  a  “40  bit  key”).22 
Although  this  may  seem  like  a  huge  number,  a 
modern  computer  capable  of  testing  100  million 
potential  passwords  per  minute  can  exhaust  all 
possible alternatives in approximately 10 days. Many 
inexpensive  software  tools  and  services  for  doing 
exactly  this  are  available  for  purchase,  e.g.,  by 
searching  the  Internet  via  www.google.com  using 
keywords,  “Word  password  decryption  crack.”  In 
contrast,  one  study  estimated  that,  on  average,  it 
would  take  a  dedicated  2001-vintage  $10  million 
computer longer than the lifetime of the universe to 
break  a  document  encrypted  using  symmetric 
encryption and a random 128-bit key.23 † 
3. “Breaking” the encryption system, by finding a 
flaw in the math underlying the encryption system’s 
algorithm  that  can  be  exploited  to  decrypt  the 
message.  One  may  think  of  this  type  of  attack  as 
using  an  unplanned  “shortcut”  to  a  cryptosystem’s 
complex math problem. These kinds of shortcuts can 
appear  in  any  cryptosystem,  but  have  historically 
been  found  in  cryptosystems  that  have  been 
deployed  with  little  or  no  peer  review.  One  such 
example  is  the  wireless  encryption  system  used  in 
many commercial and consumer wireless routers. 
                                                                                   
grade encryption. This permits safe storage and easy access to 
all your passwords. Obviously, it is critical to choose a strong 
master password and keep it confidential. 
† Note that the strength of a key of a given length depends on 
the class of encryption system. For example, while a 128-bit 
key is sufficient at present for symmetric key systems, the key 
length that would provide equivalent security in a public key 
system would need to be 1620 bits in length.24  
 
Any  document  encrypted  with  a  weak  key  is 
vulnerable to guessing attacks.17 To defend against 
the  possibility  of  poor  key  choice,  some  encryption 
systems (such as PGP, described below) automatically 
generate  random  keys.  In  general,  if  a  strong  key  is 
paired with a robust encryption system — that is, one 
based on Triple-DES,13,17 AES/Rijndael,25 Blowfish,17,26 
ECC,17,27 RSA,13,17 or one of the others that have survived 
peer  review and/or  public contests26 and thus can be 
considered  reliable  —  the  chance  of  unauthorized 
decryption is very small. 
Getting started with encrypted email 
In  general,  by  default,  most  email  programs  transmit 
email  without  encryption.  Although  encryption  is 
increasingly  being  incorporated  into  widely  available 
software,  no  single  standard  for  encrypted  email 
presently  exists.  The  closest  to  a  single  standard  for 
public-key  encrypted  email,  S/MIME,13,28  has  been 
incorporated  into  many  but  not  all  popular  email 
software  packages,  although  it  requires  some 
infrastructure  to  work.  Another  popular 
implementation is PGP (“Pretty Good Privacy”).17,29 The 
following steps are key for those wishing to start using 
encrypted email with colleagues, patients, or others: 
1.  Select cryptographic software compatible with that of 
your correspondents. 
2. Become  proficient  with  your  email  and  encryption 
software. 
3. Ensure  that  you  are  using  strong  passwords  and 
keys, and keep them confidential. 
4. For  secret  key  cryptosystems,  decide  on  a  shared 
password and communicate it to your correspondent 
securely. 
  For  public  key  cryptosystems,  each  correspondent 
will  need  to  publish  his  or  her  public  key.  How  this 
happens  depends  on  the  specific  implementation 
chosen. S/MIME users require a digital certificate (also 
known  as  a  public  key  certificate)  from  a  certificate 
authority.17,30  A  certificate  authority  is  deemed  to  be 
implicitly trustworthy; it verifies an applicant’s identity, 
then  issues  a  digital  certificate.  The  digital  certificate 
specifies  the  applicant’s  email  and  certifies  that  the 
public key, which is included in the certificate, belongs 
to the applicant. Anyone wishing to send email to a user 
looks  up  the  user’s  public  key  in  the  certificate ANALYSIS AND COMMENT                                                                                                                                    KREINDLER 
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authority’s database online. In contrast, every PGP user 
generates  and  distributes  his  or  her  own  public  key. 
Rather than relying on the certificate authority to verify 
identities, PGP uses other users to vouch for the validity 
of  each  others’  public  keys,  thereby  creating  an 
interconnected  “web  of  trust.”17,29  Keys  and  trust 
signatures can  be hosted on PGP key servers, further 
simplifying this process. 
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